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A commentary on
The poverty of embodied cognition
by Goldinger, S. D., Papesh, M. H., Barnhart, A. S., Hansen, W. A., and Hout, M. C. (2016). Psychon.
Bull. Rev. 23, 959–978. doi: 10.3758/s13423-015-0860-1
According to classic cognitive science, higher cognitive processes involve amodal mental
representations (Fodor, 1975), and are carried by brain regions other than sensorimotor areas
(Bechtel et al., 1998). Over the last few decades, this view has been questioned. Numerous
researchers argue that cognitive processes are fundamentally rooted in sensorimotor activity and
that the body both constrains and enables cognition (Wilson, 2002; Clark, 2009). Such a view
is called “the embodied cognition” (EC) and it is widely applied in various fields of cognitive
science, from linguistics to robotics. Recently, Goldinger et al. (2016), however, questioned its
applicability. They emphasized that some assumptions of EC are unacceptable, and others proffer
nothing new. Primarily, they claim that EC offers no useful insight into the classic problems of
experimental psychology. Although, we agree with some theses presented in the article (e.g., radical
embodiment that rejects the existence of mental representation is a blind alley), it appears the
authors’ methodological view on EC is inadequate.
METHODOLOGICAL STATUS OF EMBODIED COGNITION
Goldinger et al. (2016) argue that there are many classic findings which EC cannot account for,
and that it is also unable to provide any empirically testable predictions. We agree that EC cannot
directly illuminate phenomena such as the Stroop interference, attentional blink effect, or scores
obtained in the Sternberg memory-scanning paradigm. Indeed, this would be a good argument
against EC, but only if it was a single scientific theory. In our view, however, EC should be
understood as a scientific research program (Lakatos, 1976).
Research programs deliver methodological heuristics, but they are not to deliver precise
predictions, or indicate experimental setups (Lakatos, 1976). The given research program is
identified by its “hard core,” which is not something that can be falsified. Instead, it should
inspire researchers to make specific predictions (“auxiliary hypotheses”) which can build distinct
theories. These theories, in turn, should be tested, adjusted, or replaced. The theory of perceptual
symbols can serve as an example (Barsalou, 1999). It has been built on the “hard core” of “weak”
EC, according to which “semantic representations are at least partly constituted by sensory-
motor information” (Meteyard et al., 2012, p. 792), simultaneously introducing more detailed
hypotheses which can be empirically tested (Wu and Barsalou, 2009). For instance, a thesis about
the contribution of the body in cognition, which can appear as trivial, was a basis for Barsalou’s
hypothesis that sensorimotor structures are actively and systematically involved in cognitive
processing via simulation.
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The fact that the “hard core” cannot be falsified, however,
does not imply that it is completely irreplaceable. According
to Lakatos (1976), “a research programme is successful if all
this leads to a progressive problemshift, unsuccessful if it leads
to a degenerating problemshift (p. 241).” The fact that the EC
research program does not explain the cocktail party effect,
serial recall, change blindness, and many other phenomena
is not evidence for its degeneration. A growing number of
findings concerning phenomena such as processing of emotional
concepts (Davis et al., 2017), emotional memory (Baumeister
et al., 2017), metaphoric problem solving (Keefer et al.,
2013), or language comprehension (Zwaan, 2014) demonstrate
that EC leads to a progressive problemshift in cognitive
science.
EMBODIED COGNITION IS NOT SO POOR
AFTER ALL
Further examples can be found in the field of mathematical
cognition which seems, at first glance, to be a bastion of amodal
theories of knowledge representation (Banks and Flora, 1977).
The study by Dehaene et al. (1993) showed that in the parity
judgment task, left-to-right readers respond to small magnitude
numbers faster with their left hand and to large magnitude
numbers faster with their right hand. This effect has been dubbed
“Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes” (SNARC)
and has been replicated several times in various setups and
groups (see Wood et al., 2008 for meta-analysis). Reaction
times in this task are said to reflect the structure of mental
representation of the numerical continuum, which is “stretched”
from the left (small numbers) to the right side of space (greater
numbers) (Dehaene, 2011).
Fischer and Brugger (2011) presented various evidence,
including neuroscientific, for Spatial Numerical Associations
emerging prior to the acquisition of reading. Fischer (2012)
explicitly points that “numbers are embodied concepts.” This
idea is further substantiated in the study by Zago et al. (2001) who
showed that recollection of simple arithmetic operations activates
areas analogical to those active during the learning of finger
movements sequences, or manipulation of 3D objects (see also
Tschentscher et al., 2012). Andres et al. (2007) proposed a theory
according to which counting is realized through simulation of
finger movements.
The experiments on finger counting also add to the evidence
for embodiment of mathematics (Bender and Beller, 2012). There
is growing evidence that finger counting is not just a transitory
step in the acquisition of mathematical competences, but it may
also exert its influence on number processing (Previtali et al.,
2011). In particular, Klein et al. (2011) found that the structure
of finger counting affects mental arithmetic performance in
educated adults. Thus, despite Goldinger et al.’s opposition
(2016), mental arithmetic may be illuminated by EC. Moreover,
EC is the basis for training which facilitates acquisition of basic
mathematical competences (Dackermann et al., 2017). Summing
up, mathematical cognition which is seemingly the domain of
amodal processing, turns out to be deeply rooted in bodily
experiences.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
EC, like classic cognitive science (Fodor, 1975), is a scientific
research program which allows for the conceptualization and
understanding of cognitive processes, but it does not provide
in itself direct instructions for designing experiments, neither
does it enable predictions of phenomena or give explanations of
previous findings (Barsalou, 2016). The same is true for the old-
fashioned cybernetics (Wiener, 1948) or such grand theoretical
assumptions as representationalism or computationalism. The
poverty of these research programs could be discussed in the
same manner. The power of each of them lies in the fact that
they lead to illuminating individual aspects of cognition, and
all of them will be useful as long as they lead to a progressive
problemshift. Thus, the misgiving of Goldinger et al. (2016)
concerning the poverty of EC seems exaggerated.
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